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  11. Introduction 
In developing countries, actual government revenues often differ substantially from the 
amounts implied by multiplication of tax rates with the presumptive tax base. Estimates 
of this “missing revenue” are almost invariably large enough to be of macroeconomic 
significance. Following a review of attempts to measure tax evasion, McLaren (1996) 
characterizes the extent of tax evasion in general in many LDCs as “staggering”. The 
studies reviewed by McLaren suggest that the value of taxes avoided is often close to the 
value of actual collections for major taxes. With respect to trade policy, avoidance of 
taxes at the border is often combined with a complex patchwork of legal exemptions. 
Tsikata (1999) and Pritchett and Sethi (1994) find actual tariff revenues at levels between 
44% and 87% of the amounts implied by published tariff rates and estimated import 
volumes for selected developing economies in Africa and elsewhere. Since these two 
studies relied on official customs data, the revenue differences are due almost exclusively 
to legal exemptions. Accounting for corruption/smuggling would surely drive collection 
rates significantly lower. 
  Given the magnitude of the issue, the study of exemptions and tax evasion has 
received considerable attention from economists interested in public finance in 
developing countries. This literature is reviewed by Burgess and Stern (1993), who delve 
into, among other items, the perennial problem of the application of high rates to 
relatively small bases with attendant strong incentives for evasion. In more recent work, 
McLaren (1998) develops a model where evasion incentives drive the optimal tax pattern. 
McLaren’s model is consistent with the well documented tendency for poorer countries, 
with weak tax administrations, to focus revenue raising efforts on a few relatively easy to 
  2administer choke points within the economy, while more advanced economies tend to 
employ more broad based revenue raising approaches (see, for example, Tanzi and Zee, 
2002). Bliss (1992) develops a model that explicitly recognizes the limited availability of 
“tax handles” in poor economies and the concomitant important role that taxes levied at 
the border often play in these economies. 
While public finance economists highlight the importance of border taxes in 
financing activities of the state for poor countries, trade economists frequently tout the 
benefits of “openness” for growth prospects.
1 Pritchett and Sethi (1994) point out that 
these views are not necessarily in conflict in light of the actual policies pursued in most 
developing countries. Given the ubiquity of tariff exemptions, revenue neutrality can be 
maintained by accompanying tariff rate reductions with reductions in the volume of 
official exemptions.
2 The natural tendency for rate reductions to reduce the incentives to 
evade will also help bolster revenues.  
Nevertheless, the degree of disconnect, particularly in analyses of poor countries, 
between the role of revenue in the analysis of border policy and the role of the border in 
revenue analysis is striking. For example, analyses of the implications of global trade 
liberalization for developing countries under the auspices of the WTO rarely contain 
more than cursory discussion of revenue issues. Furthermore, even though evasion and 
exemptions are known to be widespread, they are rarely accounted for explicitly in 
empirical trade policy analyses for developing countries. For example, while computable 
                                                 
1 See Winters (2004) for an excellent up-to-date overview. 
2 It is recognized that reduced tariff rates combined with reduced exemptions might not constitute, 
in principle, an increase in openness. 
  3general equilibrium (CGE) models are widely recognized to have been influential in the 
formulation of trade policies for developing countries over the past two decades, few 
trade policy applications of a CGE model specifically account for evasion or exemptions. 
Exceptions, such as Bach et al. (1996), typically capture a single exemption particularly 
relevant to the analysis such as rebating of taxes on imported intermediates that are used 
for export (e.g., imported textiles later exported as wearing apparel). The authors are 
unaware of any CGE application that captures the complete patchwork of exemptions that 
bring tariff collection rates down to the levels observed by Tsikata or Pritchett and Sethi. 
This paper seeks to reduce this disconnect. To do so, a simple stylized model of tariff 
avoidance through exemptions and/or smuggling is developed. The insights from this 
model are subsequently incorporated into a detailed CGE model for Mozambique to 
consider the implications of trade policy reform. The CGE model explicitly considers 
exemptions and evasion, and since the right to import duty free while others must pay 
tariffs (for example via an exemption) has a value, the distributional implications of trade 
policy reform are also considered.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simplified model of 
international trade in order to investigate theoretical issues associated with duty free 
imports. Section 2 examines the extent and nature of duty free importation for the case of 
Mozambique specifically. Section 4 presents the CGE model employed for the analysis. 
Section 5 presents model simulations and results, while Section 6 summarizes and 
concludes. 
 
  42. A Simple Model of Trade and Tariffs with Missing Revenue 
To motivate the empirical modelling approach, a simple model of international trade is 
developed in this section. The model set out below in mathematical form contains three 
goods: an importable that is not produced domestically (M), an exportable that is 
produced, but not consumed, domestically (E), and a non-tradable that is produced and 
consumed domestically (D). There are h households with identical Cobb-Douglas 
preferences. Each household has a labour endowment zh. Production technology is linear 
in labour units, and standard neoclassical behavioural assumptions apply.
3  
Consumer demand for M  MhPm = (1-α)Yh (1)
Consumer demand for D  DhPd = αYh (2)
Consumer budget constraint  Yh = zhW+Th (3)
E production technology  E = aLE (4)
D production technology  ΣhDh = bLD (5)
E first order condition  W = apweR (6)
D first order condition  W = bPd (7)
Trade balance  pweE = pwmΣhDh (8)
Price transmission  Pm = pwm(1+t)R (9)
Government balance  ΣhTh = tΣhMhpwmR (10)
Numeraire definition  R ≡ 1  (11)
Factor market balance  LE+LD = Σhzh+WAL (12)
                                                 
3 The model is motivated by the 1-2-3 model of Devarajan et al., 1990. This model is simplified 
by assuming perfect transformation between domestics (D) and exports (E). 
  5Ignoring subscripts, L represents labour allocations, W the wage, P prices (pw indicates 
fixed world price), R the exchange rate, t the tariff rate applied to imports, α the share of 
household budget devoted to good D, and T transfers. Variables are in uppercase while 
parameters are in lower case. The variable WAL effectively drops the factor market 
balance equation (12) in accordance with Walras’ law. Note that tariff revenue is 
distributed back to households in the form of direct transfers (equation 10). Also note that 
the model, as given above, is incomplete as the distribution of transfers, Th, across 
households is left unspecified. Finally, note that by solving for Pm and Pd and substituting 
into equation sets (1) and (2), the model boils down to a system of linear equalities 
(assuming the allocation mechanism for transfers is linear). Accordingly, the model can 
be solved as long as the matrix of parameters is invertible. 
For our purposes, the closed form solution is not strictly necessary. Rather, it suffices 
to note that all prices, including the wage, can be determined as a function of the tariff 
rate t, the production parameters a and b, world prices pwe and pwm, and the exchange rate 
R, which serves as numeraire. As a result, from an individual household perspective, 
income is exogenously determined by the household specific labour endowment and the 
level of government transfer. Production side issues are essentially abstracted from and 
changes in welfare are determined uniquely by changes in prices (through, for example, 
changes in the tariff rate) and changes in transfer income.  
The model is used to consider three separate situations. 
1)  A completely ineffective tariff. 
2)  A tariff with a legal exemption scheme under which particular groups are 
allowed access to goods duty free. 
  63)  Smuggling/corruption.  
Situation 1 can be dealt with quickly. If the tariff is completely ineffective, the 
operational tariff rate is zero. There is no revenue to distribute. The model arrives at the 
free trade solution. It is worth noting that the same solution can be obtained via an 
offsetting consumer subsidy. The addition of a consumer subsidy on the purchase of 
imports can be achieved by modifying two equations of the model as follows. 
Consumer demand for M  MhPm(1-s) = (1-α)Yh (1a)
Government balance  ΣhTh = t ΣhMhpwmR- s ΣhMhPm (10a)
It is straightforward to show that, if (1-s)(1+t)=1, the free trade equilibrium is re-
established.  
Situation 2 recognizes the existence of enclave entities that often receive special trade 
treatment. For example, expatriates and locals, who travel frequently, are often able to 
avoid paying import tariffs. Government regularly exempts itself from import tariffs, and 
large investment projects negotiate special import treatment (see Gauthier and Reinikka, 
2001 for discussion of these phenomena in the case of Uganda). Here, the markets for 
imports are divided. Some groups import and consume with tariff laden prices while 
others import and consume at world prices. We focus on division of markets across 
households in our simplified model. This situation requires further modification to the 
model. The market division can be achieved in at least two ways. First, a subscript h 
could be added to the tariff rate, t. In this case, only certain groups pay the tariff. This 
modification also requires an h subscript on the domestic price of imports, Phm. 
Alternatively, an offsetting consumption subsidy to specific households, sh, can achieve 
  7the same outcome when a single tariff rate is applied in a manner analogous to the 
ineffective tariff situation considered above. These modifications are shown below. 
Consumer demand for M  MhPhm(1- sh) = (1-α)Yh (1b)
Price transmission  Phm = pwm(1+th)R (9b)
Government balance  ΣhTh = th ΣhMhpwmR- sh ΣhMhPhm (10b)
Any given household j faces free trade prices if (1-sj)(1+tj)=1. Further, in this simple 
model, if household j also receives zero transfers, it faces the free trade equilibrium.  
Situation 3 captures the basic elements of smuggling and/or corruption. Suppose that 
household j possesses the means and/or rights to import duty free. It both imports 
commodities duty free for direct consumption and imports and resells commodities at the 
tariff laden price. This situation can be modelled by setting (1-sj)(1+tj)=1 (for household j 
only). Resale of imported products at the tariff laden price can be captured by imposing 
the posted tariff rate t on imports of these goods that are resold but directing the value of 
this tariff revenue to household j in the form of a transfer, Tj. Effectively, household j 
consumes at world prices and obtains revenue by importing at world prices and selling at 
tariff laden domestic prices.
4  
Reality is, of course, much more complicated than the simple model presented above. 
However, our model does capture important elements of tariff avoidance, namely who 
gets the benefits from this avoidance. In addition, it provides insights into modelling 
                                                 
4 The model presented above differs from the model presented by Pitt (1981) in that duty free 
importation is not necessarily disguised or “cloaked” in any way. This is clearly the case for official 
exemptions. Furthermore, a study at a major border post between South Africa and Mozambique (Macamo 
1998) observed substantial volumes of illegal flows without significant difficulty. 
  8strategies for more complex empirical models. The simple neoclassical world where 
domestic prices are fixed by world prices is analytically convenient. It is also, in our 
view, appropriate for the case of the same good imported under different regimes. In 
other words, once safely within a developing country such as Mozambique, it seems 
logical to view smuggled beer and officially imported beer as indistinguishable products. 
These ideas are woven into the CGE model of international trade, which is presented in 
Section 4. The following section investigates the empirical importance of the issues 
discussed above for the case of Mozambique. 
 
3. Mozambique: Import Values, Tariff Revenues, and Rents 
National accounts information combined with tariff rate data can be employed to derive 
an implicit estimate of the value of goods entering duty free as was done above. A direct 
attempt at valuing unrecorded trade flows for the case of Mozambique was undertaken by 
Macamo (1998). He systematically attempted to observe unrecorded cross border trade at 
major border checkpoints with neighbouring countries. He estimated $98 million in 
illegal trade for the year 1996.
5 This amounts to only about 10% of the value of total 
trade in 1996, which is considerably less than the level of duty-free importation implied 
by national accounts. However, some degree of differential is appropriate. Macamo 
focused on cross border trade with Mozambique’s neighbours while significant imports 
also arrive from overseas. In addition, Macamo focused on small, relatively 
unsophisticated operators with larger presumably more sophisticated operators “not 
                                                 
5 More precisely, Macamo estimated unrecorded trade for the period December 1995 to November 
1996. 
  9necessarily” included (Macamo, 1998, p. 12). Finally, Macamo did not observe legal 
exemptions, which constitute a significant share of duty free imports. So, while the 
degree of precision in all of these figures leaves much to be desired, these two estimates 
of unrecorded trade paint a qualitatively similar picture of large volumes of goods 
entering the country duty free.
6  
Since substantial volumes of goods enter Mozambique duty free, as is the case in 
other developing countries, the overall average tariff rate (total tariff revenue divided by 
the total CIF value of imports) in 1997 was relatively low at 6.9%. Nevertheless, 
substantial volumes of imports do arrive through official channels and pay duty at the 
published or marginal rate, which is typically well above the average rate. The marginal 
import appears to be tariff inclusive; so, the price of traded goods within the country 
reflects the world price and the associated marginal tariff rate. When tariff rates are high, 
significant benefits therefore accrue to those individuals with ability to import duty free 
either through legal exemptions or through smuggling/corruption at official border points. 
While benefits clearly accrue to those with ability to import duty free, incentives also 
exist to incur substantially higher transportation costs in order to move goods 
clandestinely across official and unofficial entry points. In this case, some share of the 
rents associated with bringing a good into Mozambique without paying duty is absorbed 
in real resource costs. Macamo (1998) finds evidence for this. For example, border 
traders wishing to evade tariffs often divide goods into small lots and hire numerous 
transporters to bring the goods across the border before re-amassing the contraband for 
                                                 
6 McLaren (1996) reviews efforts to measure evasion in taxes other than border taxes for less 
developed economies. Evasion is estimated to be very substantial in all cases. 
  10transport to consumption centres. This is clearly much more expensive than simply 
driving the goods across the border in a truck. However, the evidence collected by 
Macamo confirms that the large majority of unrecorded cross border transactions (with 
neighbouring countries) either passes through or very close to official entry points.
7 Some 
simply pass straight through in trucks with very minor to no increment in transport costs 
relative to official imports. Even when dissembled into smaller lots, the incremental 
transport cost appears to be small compared to the value of the tariffs avoided. Macamo 
considers beer head transported, which draws an incremental transport cost of only about 
10-15% of the value of the tariffs avoided. Regarding international seaports, one would 
expect incremental transport costs to be relatively small since the options in terms of 
physical transport are much more limited. Incremental transport costs are almost surely 
about zero for officially exempted goods.  
Table 1 shows import values and actual tariff revenue according to the commodity 
classification employed in the social accounting matrix (SAM) underlying the 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model employed for analysis in this paper.
8 
About 44% of the value of imports entered the country duty free in 1997 despite positive 
posted tariff rates. However, as indicated in the Table, duty free imports tend to be 
concentrated in sectors with higher posted tariff rates.
9 Therefore, as indicated above, 
                                                 
7 Given the underdeveloped state and characteristics of the existing transport infrastructure, this is 
not surprising. 
8 The SAM can be obtained from the authors on request. 
9 In many cases, the same posted tariff rate does not apply across all the goods comprising the 
aggregate commodities shown in Table 1. As a result, aggregation of posted tariff rates is necessary in 
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60% of the total tariff revenue implied by the multiplication of posted tariff rates with 
actual import volumes. 
Protection rates are highest for Food Processing, Beverages and Tobacco, and 
Primary Product Processing (which include textiles, clothing, and leather products). The 
rates for exemptions and unrecorded trade in these categories are estimated to be 
particularly high as well with more than 80% of the value of these products entering the 
country duty free (value shares and shares of tariff revenue foregone are the same in this 
instance since a flat rate of 35% was applied to all goods in these three categories). The 
commodity composition observed by Macamo also reflects this concentration of 
unrecorded trade in these three commodity categories. 
Finally, it is worth noting that Processed Food, Beverages and Tobacco, and Primary 
Product Processing represent an important part of consumers’ budgets. The 1997 SAM 
indicates that these products accounted for about 29% and 37% of total expenditure for 
rural and urban households respectively. Consequently, price changes for these 
commodities have the potential to impact household welfare fairly strongly. 
The high volume of goods entering duty free and concomitant low revenue collection 
ratios have strong implications for the revenue effects from trade policy reform. In 
principle, the revenue-reducing effects of reducing peak rates could be offset by their 
                                                                                                                                                 
order to determine the actual tariff rate that should be applied. A number of complex conceptual issues are 
associated with appropriate aggregation of tariff rates. These issues are explored in Bach et al. (1996), 
among other sources. In Table 1, the posted tariff rates reflect weighted averages of import volumes with a 
small corrective factor to account for the fact that higher tariffs tend to drive down import volumes. 
  12application to a broader base through elimination of official exemptions and reductions in 
incentives to smuggle. In a review of detailed tariff line and collection rate data for three 
countries, Pritchett and Sethi (1994) find that reductions in peak rates would likely have 
minimal or even positive revenue effects. Under these circumstances, the allocation 
efficiencies of trade liberalization are realized (as long as marginal or published tariff 
rates define domestic prices) while government revenue remains essentially the same. 
The primary losers are individuals with the ability to import duty free and those receiving 
corruption payments. It can be safely assumed that the poor are unlikely to figure 
prominently among this group. 
 
4. Modelling Approach 
The basic purpose of trade liberalization is to alter relative prices, including factor prices, 
in order to expand production in sectors with comparative advantage. These sectors must 
therefore, under most conditions, attract factors of production (land, labour, and capital) 
from other industries. Using this perspective, trade liberalization is inherently an 
economy-wide phenomenon, and we are particularly interested in analyzing trade policy 
reform that attempts to exploit the low import tariff coverage ratios observed in the data. 
For this purpose, we opt to employ an economy-wide modelling approach. 
1.1. The Mozambique CGE Model and SAM 
The current Mozambique CGE model was derived from an existing CGE model of 
Mozambique with special features added. Tarp et al. (2002) provide detailed explanations 
of the basic CGE model that was revised for the purposes of this analysis. Relatively 
  13straightforward elements are briefly discussed first. More novel aspects are then 
presented. 
The model assumes profit maximization by producers under translog technology and 
utility maximization with Cobb-Douglas preferences by consumers. The government 
implicitly maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function (constant expenditure shares) while 
investment is allocated in a Leontief fashion (a fixed basket of goods). The Armington 
(1969) assumption is employed with constant elasticity of transformation functions on the 
export side and constant elasticity of substitution functions on the import side. The 
external sector of the model is closed by fixing foreign currency inflows (primarily aid) 
and allowing the exchange rate to adjust. Investment is driven by available savings. 
Finally, the government deficit is fixed (more details on government closure are provided 
in the simulations section). The model numeraire is the consumer price index. Finally, 
detailed accounting for marketing margins is accomplished as described in Arndt et al. 
(2000). 
The novel features of the Mozambique model as applied here involve the 
simultaneous capturing of average and marginal tariff rates when these diverge. As 
shown in Table 1, such differences are substantial in Mozambique. When confronted with 
this situation the CGE modeller has traditionally faced a choice. One can apply the 
average tariff rate, which gets revenue correct. This is clearly desirable in public finance 
applications. However, this approach understates the true import tariff wedge at the 
margin, which is in focus in trade policy analysis. Alternatively, one can apply the 
published rate, which overstates tariff revenue, but captures the distortions inherent in 
trade policy. 
  14In practice, modelling goals (and expedience) have guided analytical choices. For 
example, GTAP data usually reflect published (marginal) tariff rates since most users are 
trade policy focused and the model is relatively poorly suited to public finance 
applications (McDougall and Dimaran, 2002). On the other hand, a series of studies of 
southern African economies conducted by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) typically employed average tariff rates since the public finance 
dimensions of these studies maintained a higher profile (see, for example, Tarp et al. 
2002). 
While the choice has typically been one or the other, both the average and the 
marginal rates can in fact be captured in a CGE model using the analytical model derived 
Section 2. Conceptually, the issue can be viewed as a tariff rate quota where a certain 
volume of imports enters the country duty free and the remainder enters the country at a 
strictly positive tariff rate (i.e. the published tariff rate). As in the case of a tariff rate 
quota, the ability to import duty free (or at the within quota rate) has a value. For those 
with access to goods duty free, the tariff revenue foregone by the government effectively 
represents income in the form of either a rent or an implicit subsidy. With relatively few 
modifications, the basic machinery for modelling tariff rate quotas can be applied to the 
issue of low rates of tariff revenue collection (see Elbehri and Pearson, 2000 for general 
equilibrium analysis of tariff rate quotas). 
In the particular case, in focus here, the implicit value of tariffs avoided is calculated 
for each commodity. The actual tariff inclusive import value of all commodities is then 
augmented by the respective amounts of tariff payments avoided through (legal or illegal) 
duty free importation in order to obtain the CIF value of imports including the full 
  15amount of tariff revenue implied by published rates. From the theory discussion 
presented in Section 2, the destination of the virtual tariff revenue (the tariff revenue not 
actually collected by government) depends upon the use of the imported commodity. If it 
is imported and then consumed directly, the importing/consuming agent could be viewed 
as paying the import tariff and receiving an exactly offsetting consumer subsidy. If the 
good is imported and then resold at tariff laden prices, then the importing agent could be 
viewed as receiving a transfer from the government equivalent to the value of the tariff 
revenue avoided. 
There is very little information to indicate the share of duty free imports that is 
consumed directly and the corresponding share that is resold at tariff laden prices. Legal 
exemptions would tend to fall into the former category while smuggled goods would tend 
to fall into the latter. The available evidence indicates that both of these categories are 
important. However, for Beverages and Tobacco, Food Processing and Primary Product 
Processing, where tariff rates and tariff avoidance are the highest, the share that is resold 
at tariff laden prices likely predominates. In this light, we assume that 33% of duty free 
imports are consumed directly and the remaining 67% are imported and resold. Further, 
we assume that government, investment, and urban household accounts have some ability 
to import duty free and consume directly. Rents (modelled as transfers) from importing 
duty free and reselling at tariff-laden prices are assumed to accrue to urban households.
10 
Rural households, on the other hand, are assumed not to have access to duty free goods. 
                                                 
10 To simplify the modeling, the real resource costs associated with importing duty free are 
assumed to be zero. If real resource outlays to avoid tariffs are indeed a relatively small share of the value 
of tariffs avoided, as the available evidence suggests, then this simplification is harmless. The other case, 
  16In the model, price linkage equations remain exactly as before. So, for example, 
import prices are equal to the world price converted to domestic currency times the sum 
of one plus the marginal tariff rate (plus any marketing margins). The tariff revenue side 
differs. Similar to the perspective of duty free imports as a tariff rate quota, we assume, 
on a commodity by commodity basis, that a certain fraction of imports enters the country 
duty free while the remaining fraction pays marginal tariffs. Actual tariff revenue in the 
government revenue equation becomes this fraction multiplied by the value of tariffs 
implied by the full marginal tariff rate. The remaining amount, the value of tariffs 
avoided, is divided between consumption subsidies (relating to goods that are consumed 
directly) and direct transfers to urban households (relating to goods that are imported and 
then resold). 
 
5. Simulations and Results 
1.2. Simulations 
Table 2 illustrates the simulations undertaken with the model. In the first, labelled “All 
Products Pay”, the share of products imported duty free is set to zero while all tariff rates 
are adjusted proportionately to maintain revenue neutrality with respect to all indirect 
taxes (not just tariff revenue). Consumption subsidies reflecting direct consumption of 
products imported duty free are also set to zero. This corresponds to a fictional scenario 
where all legal exemptions are eliminated and all smuggling is stopped. In the second, 
                                                                                                                                                 
involving significant real resource outlays, has been examined in the seminal paper by Krueger (1974) 
among others. 
  17labelled “Flat Tariff Rates”, all non-zero tariff rates are reset to a single level that 
maintains revenue neutrality with respect to all indirect taxes.
11 The share of products 
imported duty free remains constant. Consumption subsidies adjust to offset the level of 
virtual tariff revenue associated with direct consumption of duty free imports. In the 
third, labelled “Both”, the share of products imported duty free drops to zero and all 
positive tariff rates are reset to a single rate. This rate is adjusted to maintain revenue 
neutrality with respect to all indirect taxes. 
The simulations are designed to investigate the implications of a lower tax rate 
applied to a wider base, a common public finance application. As in most public finance 
applications, careful attention is given to the maintenance of revenue neutrality. 
Maintenance of total indirect tax revenue was also targeted since these are the taxes that 
interact with the price system. The value of indirect taxes (less output subsidies) 
represented 75% of government revenue in 1997. Changes in revenue from indirect taxes 
have implications for welfare analysis. As shown by Robinson and Thierfelder (1999), 
changes in indirect tax rates that change indirect tax revenue invalidate wages as an 
acceptable welfare indicator. With the revenue closure adopted, wages remain an 
acceptable welfare indicator (at least for the large majority of the population that lacks 
rights to import duty free). 
The motivating notion behind the simulations is that lower tariff rates substantially 
reduce the incentives to evade tariffs. Therefore, revenue neutrality is maintained in all 
simulations. In order to separate out effects, the first simulations consider what happens if 
                                                 
11 As Table 1 indicates, the tariff rate applied to some imports, particularly services, is zero in the 
base. These rates remain at zero in all simulations. 
  18all duty free importation could be eliminated. The second scenario tracks the implications 
of applying a single flat tariff rate to all commodities while the share of commodities 
entering the country duty free remains the same. 
The third scenario combines the first two scenarios to create a scenario of policy 
interest. This scenario asks the question: “what flat tariff rate applied to all imported 
commodities (excluding commodities with a tariff rate of zero in the base) would be 
required to maintain revenue assuming all imported goods paid tariffs at the published 
rate, and what are the welfare implications of this policy?” 
1.3. Results 
Macroeconomic results are illustrated in Table 3. Trade expands in all scenarios. Growth 
in trade is led by increased imports of processed food, beverages and tobacco, and 
processed primary products, which are associated with the highest initial rates of 
protection. Reductions in tariff rates applied to these products are large in all scenarios. In 
scenario one, the existing rate structure is reduced by nearly two thirds (see the Tariff 
Rate Expansion Factor at the bottom of the Table). Consequently, rates on these three 
commodities decline from 35% to about 12%. In scenario two, duty free shares remain 
constant but tariffs are reset to a single flat rate of about 17% (the flat tariff rate is equal 
to the Tariff Rate Expansion Factor). For most commodities, this involves a tariff rate 
increase, which tends to reduce trade volumes. However, for the three highly taxed 
commodities mentioned above, tariffs decline by 18 percentage points. The net effect is a 
very small increase in trade volumes in this scenario. 
Scenario three involves the elimination of exemptions and the application of a flat 
tariff rate. Under these conditions, revenue neutrality can be maintained with a 7% tariff 
  19rate. This involves a substantial tariff rate cut for each of the commodity aggregates. 
However, trade expands less than in scenario one (All products pay) since importing duty 
free and consuming directly is no longer an option. All products are assessed duties.
12 
The expansion of imports induces a devaluation of the currency in order to stimulate 
import competing and exporting sectors. Due to the very large level of external financing 
received by Mozambique, the value of imports massively exceeds the value of exports. 
As a result, exports must grow by proportionately much more for a given proportional 
change in imports in order to maintain external balance. Real GDP changes little in all 
scenarios, but total absorption – a measure of economy-wide welfare – increases mildly 
in the “Flat” and “Both” scenarios. 
Table 4 provides information on the contribution of each sector to real GDP at factor 
cost in the base, the level of value added generated by each sector, and the percentage 
change in real value added generated by each producing sector for each scenario. 
Focusing on the third scenario (“Both”), one observes some changes in the composition 
of value added, but they are not dramatic. Small sectors that enjoy substantial protection, 
such as Beverages and Tobacco, shrink when protection is removed. Increases in 
production are observed in Insurance and Finance. Import penetration in this sector is 
fairly large at about 30% of the value of domestic consumption. The devaluation enables 
this sector to compete more effectively against imports and hence increase value added. 
                                                 
12 As indicated earlier, deriving an appropriate aggregate tariff rate for an aggregate commodity is 
complex. It is worth noting that some components of some aggregates are taxed at a rate lower than 7%. 
So, the 7% flat rate does represent a tariff rate increase for some commodities when a more detailed level 
of disaggregation is considered. 
  20The devaluation also increases the local currency value of foreign capital inflows. Since 
most of these inflows fund investment expenditure, investment spending increases 
spurring activity in, for example, the construction sector. An intuitive explanation of the 
decline in value added produced by the livestock sector will be deferred for later. 
Table 5 provides information on factor prices. In all scenarios, all wages and rental 
rates increase relative to the base. The increases range from about 1.5% to 1.8% for all 
factors. This implies that all households lacking access to duty free imports benefit from 
the policy change. These are compelling results that are relatively simple to explain. Two 
broad effects dominate these increases in real wages. 
First, the figures reported in Table 5 are real factor prices with deflation being 
performed by the consumer price index (the numeraire). As indicated above, the three 
commodities with the highest rates of protection (Processed Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco, and Processed Primary Products) represent a significant share of the consumer 
consumption bundle. When protection is removed, prices for these commodities decline. 
The level of the consumer price index (CPI) cannot decline by definition. Only relative 
prices matter in a CGE model. As a result, other prices, including factor prices, tend to 
rise relative to the CPI in order to achieve a relative decline in the prices of the basket of 
goods comprising the CPI. 
Second, as indicated earlier, the rents that accrue from importing duty-free and 
reselling on the domestic market at tariff laden prices function in a manner analogous to 
imposing a tariff and having the government reimburse these “tariff payments” back to 
those relatively few individuals with the right to import duty-free. In a macroeconomic 
sense, the rents from duty-free importation and subsequent resale function like a tariff (an 
  21indirect tax) that is later reimbursed (a direct transfer) to selected individuals.
13 
Reductions in these “transfers”, through tariff rate reductions (which lower the implicit 
value of the rents) or reductions in the share of goods imported duty free, function like 
reductions in standard tariffs with concomitant reductions in transfers. 
The macroeconomic impact on wages can best be perceived by considering a 
fundamental national accounting identity: 
IT GDPfc GDP M X G I C + = = − + + + ) ( 
where C is consumption, I investment, G government expenditure, X exports, M imports, 
GDP gross domestic product, GDPfc GDP at factor cost, and IT total indirect taxes. The 
right hand side of the above expression can be rewritten as: 
∑ + + +
o r o
i i IT TR TR w E  
where Ei represents the quantity of each factor employed, wi the wage for each factor, 
TR
o official tariff revenue, TR
r rents from resale of goods imported duty free, and IT
o 
other sources of indirect tax revenue. The sum of employment of endowments (in this 
case, various categories of labour and capital) multiplied by their respective wages yields 
GDP at factor cost. The sum of the three tax components gives total indirect taxes. 
In the simulations considered here, endowment supplies are fixed and fully employed. 
Hence, the only way to increase nominal GDP at factor cost is to increase wages. By 
assumption in each scenario, the sum TR
o + IT
o is held constant. The remaining term 
represents the rents from resale of goods imported duty free, TR
r. In scenarios one and 
                                                 
13 Direct consumption of duty free imports, on the other hand, functions as if the government had 
imposed a tariff at the border and then given back the revenue in the form of a commodity specific 
consumption subsidy. These two indirect taxes exactly offset one another. 
  22three, this value is reduced from about 2.4% of GDP at factor cost to zero. If nominal 
GDP remained constant and TR
r were the only source of indirect tax revenue, average 
wages would have to increase by about 2.4%. In the event, nominal (CPI deflated) GDP 
declines by about 0.6% and other indirect tax revenue sources remain in place (at a 
constant value). Simple calculations indicate that average factor prices must rise by 
slightly more than 1.7%, which is approximately equal to the change in the weighted 
average factor price one obtains from Table 5. 
This effect on nominal wages often leads to the erroneous conclusion that trade 
liberalization increases household and economy-wide welfare due to the wage effect. As 
pointed out by Robinson and Thierfelder (1999), this is not necessarily the case. For 
example, if the tariff revenue is replaced by direct taxes such as income taxes, households 
might find that the increase in income taxes more than offsets the “wage increase” which 
follows from reductions in indirect tax revenue. In this instance, the household is not 
better off. More generally, using factor prices as a welfare indicator in trade liberalization 
scenarios will tend to overstate the benefits of trade liberalization if the implications of 
reductions in government tariff revenue are not accounted for. 
In order to conduct an acceptable welfare analysis using wages, we must account, not 
for the reduction in tariff revenue actually collected (which remains essentially constant), 
but for the reduction in rents accruing to those with the ability to import duty free. Even 
though we know relatively little about these people, it is safe to assume that they are not 
particularly numerous and that they are not poor. For these relatively few individuals 
(such as corrupt border guards), the reductions in the rents received will almost surely 
exceed the average increment to wages predicted by the model. Hence, their welfare 
  23declines. However, for the large majority of working people who lack access to duty free 
imports, wages are an acceptable welfare indicator. The results indicate that wages for 
these people will rise (with no offsetting reduction in rents). 
A composite view of welfare effects on households can be obtained by examining 
household equivalent variation. This is done in Table 6. As shown, urban household 
welfare declines very substantially while rural household welfare increases 
substantially.
14 The decline in urban household welfare is attributable entirely to the 
disappearance of rents from resale of products imported duty free, which formerly 
accounted for about 5.6% of total income. If the information existed to divide urban 
households into those receiving rents and those not receiving rents, simple calculations 




                                                 
14 These are large numbers for trade policy simulations where welfare changes are often on the 
order of 1%. 
15 This aggregation of urban households into a single average helps to explain the somewhat 
counterintuitive decline in livestock production shown in Table 4. Urban households are, on average, 
considerably wealthier than rural households; and they direct a much larger fraction of their income to meat 
consumption. When average urban household income declines, direct demand for livestock products 
declines as well. In addition, marketed meat products (butchered animals) are considered processed foods. 
With declines in domestic processed food production following reductions in tariffs, intermediate demand 
for livestock products falls as well. A more detailed analysis with more disaggregate data would provide a 
more precise insight into production effects for the livestock sector. 
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Tax exemptions and smuggling are basic characteristics of many developing countries. 
De facto tax collections are consequently far below revenue implied by published 
(marginal) or de jure tax rates. Efforts to address this problem have therefore been a key 
component of economic reform programmes geared at macroeconomic stabilization and 
promoting a better balance in public finances. Yet, there is a curious lack of consistency 
between the way in which respectively public finance and trade policy analysts have 
treated average and marginal tax rates. Public finance studies typically rely on average 
tariffs, which get revenue right. Yet, this approach underestimates the distortions inherent 
in trade policy, which are, in turn, a prime concern of trade analysts. They have therefore 
traditionally resorted to using published rates, even if this leads to overstating revenue. 
The above disconnect is unsatisfactory, in both theory and practice. In Section 2 we 
therefore developed a simple theoretical model to clarify the conceptual issues involved 
in capturing average and marginal tariff rates simultaneously in a common analytical 
framework. Motivated by this model, we proceeded in Section 4 to demonstrate that the 
key methodological challenge faced in this paper can in large measure be viewed as a 
tariff rate quota (TRQ) within a model of international trade where a certain volume of 
imports enters a country duty free whereas the remainder enters at a strictly positive tariff 
rate. We also noted that the ability to import duty free has a value as in the case with a 
TRQ. For those with access to duty free goods, the tariff revenue foregone by the 
government effectively represents income, in the form of a rent or as an implicit subsidy.  
In sum, we demonstrated that the basic machinery known from modelling TRQs can 
be applied to the combined public revenue and trade issue at hand. On this basis, we 
  25adjusted a standard CGE model of international trade, so it could be applied to conduct a 
trade policy analysis with specific attention to capturing the importance of divergence 
between average and marginal tariff rates. Thus, we took as our point of departure the 
fact that CGE models represent an attractive framework for the analysis of public finance 
issues for low income countries, and proceeded to detailed accounting of revenue from 
the border, which is a natural extension from models focused on trade policy. Similarly, 
improved representation in the model of the actual implementation of trade policies is 
clearly important for the items of classic interest to trade economists such as the structure 
of production, welfare, and income distribution.  
The model was implemented with Mozambique as case study, with basic information 
provided in Section 2. Yet, we argue that the analytical approach developed here is easily 
replicable and could be brought to bear on a series of other countries across the 
developing world. Moreover, our results in Section 5 indicate that there are considerable 
possibilities for increasing both efficiency and equity. Losers from trade reforms include 
those households (urban households by assumption), who benefited from their ability to 
import duty free one way or the other. It is highly unlikely that these rent-creaming 
households are particularly poor. In contrast, the welfare of poor rural families increases 
following trade reform. In the scenario “Both” where a flat tariff rate is applied and all 
duty-free importation ceases, rural household welfare as measured by equivalent 
variation increases by about 1.9%. The implications for wages are strongly positive and 
remarkably uniform indicating that the large majority of the urban population that does 
not enjoy access to duty free goods becomes better off following reforms. All in all, we 
appear to be as close to a win-win policy recommendation, one can in practice hope for. 
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  29Table 1 
 
 
Import values, tariff rates, and tariff revenues for 1997 
Sources: National acc a Aduaneira for 












Primary Ag. Crops 662 10.0 66 60 9.6
P r i m a r y  A g .  L i v e s t o c k 8 5 1 0 . 086
Forestry and Firewood 5 46.1 2 2 0.0
Extraction 77 12.5 10 9 3.2
Food Processing 1,803 35.0 631 117 81.4
Beverages and Tobacco 298 35.0 104 17 83.4
Primary Product Processing 1,046 35.0 366 62 83.1
Chemicals 2,022 15.0 303 165 45.7
Other Manufactures 4,172 15.0 626 381 39.0
Other Services 168 0.0 0 0 0.0
Construction 0 0.0 0 0 0.0
Commerce 0 0.0 0 0 0.0
Transport and Communication 140 0.0 0 0 0.0
Insurance and Finance 1,308 0.0 0 0 0.0
Public Administration and Def. 0 0.0 0 0 0.0
Education 0 0.0 0 0 0.0
H e a l t h 00 . 000
Labor Intensive Services 0 0.0 0 0 0.0
B i g  P r o j e c t s 00 . 000
Big Project Imports 45 0.0 0 0 0.0
Total or Weighted Average 11,831 17.9 2,117 820 61.3
2 9 . 5
0 . 0
0 . 0
ounts for 1997 for import volumes and tariff revenues and Paut
Note: All value figures are in billions of meticais. In 1997, the exchange rate was approximately 11,406 









1The tariff rate expansion factor is not in terpretation of this factor differs by 
scenario. In scenarios “Base” and “All products pay”, the factor multiplies existing marginal tariff rates. In 
narios.  
Label Description
Base Base data in billions of meticais.
All products pay
The share of products imported duty free drops to zero while tariff rates 
are adjusted proportionately to maintain revenue neutrality.
Flat tariff rates
All positive tariff rates are reset to a single level that maintains revenue 
neutrality. The share of products imported duty free remains constant.
Both
The share of products imported duty free drops to zero and all positive 







rates (%) Both (%)
Exchange Rate 1.00 5.0 1.4 5.0
Real GDP 40,609 0.1 0.1 0.1
Total Absorption 48,357 0.0 0.4 0.3
Imports 11,831 1.7 0.0 1.4
Exports 4,083 4.9 0.1 4.2
Investment 8,173 3.9 -0.3 3.0
Tariff Rate Expansion Factor
1 1.00 0.35 0.17 0.07
Note: All base value metical figures are in billions. Also, the levels of some macroeconomic agg
differ slightly from published values due to more explicit accounting for the rents associated with 
importation. 
 percentage terms and the in
scenarios “Flat tariff rates” and “Both”, the factor still multiplies all tariff rates; however, these are all set to 
one. So, the expansion factor is the unique tariff rate applied to all goods with strictly positive tariff rates in 
these two sce
 Table 4 






rates (%) Both (%)
Primary Ag. Crops 27.4 9,963 -0.4 0.8 0.0
Primary Ag. Livestock 2.2 795 -2.1 0.3 -1.6
Forestry and Firewood 3.2 1,156 0.2 0.2 0.3
Extraction 4.3 1,570 2.4 0.5 2.3
Food Processing 3.3 1,198 -1.6 -1.2 -1.9
Beverages and Tobacco 0.9 313 -5.3 -3.1 -5.9
Primary Product Processing 2.2 802 -3.0 -3.2 -4.0
Chemicals 0.6 231 -1.7 0.4 -1.3
Other Manufactures 1.1 410 0.3 0.6 0.4
Other Services 8.3 3,018 -0.9 -0.4 -1.0
Construction 6.5 2,375 3.3 -0.2 2.6
Commerce 20.1 7,337 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
Transport and Communication 8.9 3,236 0.0 -0.2 -0.1
Insurance and Finance 4.6 1,682 3.1 0.1 2.6
Public Administration and Def. 2.8 1,007 0.0 0.0 0.0
Education 1.6 601 -0.7 -0.2 -0.7
Health 0.5 179 -0.5 -0.1 -0.5
Labor Intensive Services 1.5 550 0.4 0.1 0.4




 Table 5 
 
 
Real (CPI deflated) wages 
Note: All base values for wages are
Table 6 
Household welfare me  equivalent variation 





rates (%) Both (%)
Unskilled Ag Labor 1.63 0.6 2.1 1.6
Skilled Ag Labor 2.66 0.5 2.2 1.6
Unskilled Non-Ag Labor 6.99 1.4 0.5 1.5
Skilled Non-Ag Labor 23.96 1.9 0.2 1.8
Highly Skilled Non-Ag Labor 57.03 1.9 0.2 1.8







rates (%) Both (%)
Urban 15,891 -3.9 -1.1 -3.8
Rural 20,102 1.6 1.1 1.9  
Note: All base value metical figures are in billions. 
 
 
 
 